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Of Sheepdogs and Ventriloquists: Government
Lawyers in Two New Deal Agencies
DANIEL R. ERNST†
American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science, John
Henry Schlegel’s masterful study of how a circle of American law
professors, seeking a professional identity within the modern
university, tried on but then discarded the garb of social scientists,
performs a very difficult historical feat: it presents its subjects’
thought with great depth and subtlety but also as a means to an
end in a fully rendered social setting, the American law school in
the first decades of the last century. For any legal historian trying
to work out how to write about ideas not just “in the books” but
also “in action,” to see them as part of professionals’ quest for
authority, and to draw upon sociological theory without derailing
a narrative throughline, the book has been an indispensable
model. It certainly has been for me as I have studied the lawyers
of the New Deal. Few of those lawyers appear in Schlegel’s book
and then only in supporting roles. They worked in vast
government buildings rather than academic cloisters.

†Georgetown University Law Center.
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But for New Deal lawyers quite as much as for Schlegel’s Legal
Realists, ideas were their stock-in-trade, employed in pursuit of
professional power.
*****
“Research on state building in the U.S.,” writes the political
scientist Gerald Berk, “usually holds twentieth-century
governance to a single set of standards, namely those of Weberian
(or Prussian) bureaucracy: autonomy, hierarchy, legitimate
authority, professionalism, and the capacity to monitor and
control economic behavior.”1 Typically it emphasizes the United
States’s departure from a continental European norm. European
nations bureaucratized before they democratized, but the United
States adopted universal white male suffrage before it created
many centralized, locality penetrating bureaucracies.2 When it
came to America, bureaucratic autonomy, the condition in which
“a politically differentiated agency takes self-consistent action
that neither politicians nor organized interests prefer but that
they either cannot or will not overturn or constrain in the future,”
rarely proceeded from the top down, through orderly hierarchies
of specialized, full-time officials.3 Rather it emerged in the middle
of federal executive departments as bureau chiefs and other
“mezzo-level” bureaucrats recruited nonpartisan staffs,
developed state capacity, and cultivated constituencies.4
Scholars of American political development have long
recognized that the legal profession has had an outsized role in
building the national state. Stephen Skowronek, for example,
considered lawyers the “special intellectual cadre” that ran the
nineteenth-century state of courts and parties.5 Further, the
sociologist Terence Halliday has distinguished two ways in which

1. Gerald Berk, The National Recovery Administration Reconsidered, 25 STUD. AM.
POL. DEV. 56, 83 (2011).
2. MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE STATE, at 14–15 (1994).
3. DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS,
NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928, at 17 (2001).
4. Id. at 167.
5. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 31 (1982).
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lawyers engage in politics, turning on the nature of the authority
they assert. “Technical” authority arises from the special expertise
of the professional.6 For lawyers, Halliday mentioned “skill in
understanding statutes, drafting contracts, and executing
corporate mergers,” which lawyers can exercise “without taking
an explicit stand on what the law should contain.”7 “Normative”
authority relates to “broad issues of public policy concerning
which every citizen should be in a position to come to a decision.”8
Lawyers are most authoritative when they invoke their technical
authority, but because lawyers have “technical authority in a
normative system,” they have “an unusual opportunity to exercise
moral authority in the name of technical advice” and “exert
enormous influence in great tracts of social life.”9
When I started in on a book on New Deal lawyers with such
literatures in mind, I expected to find my subjects employing their
technical authority to bring the responsible executive and
bureaucratic autonomy to the federal government. I pictured
them as sheepdogs, nipping at the heels of potentially wayward
administrators. By authoritatively interpreting statutes, they
would help agency heads keep mezzobureaucrats in line. By
requiring that orders be supported by finding of facts on a record,
they would keep officials from wandering into the arms of
businesses and professional politicians. Sometimes the lawyers
behaved just this way, but, even then, they followed their own
professional and political instincts rather than simply heeding
their master’s voice.
Consider the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA).
It was created within the US Department of Agriculture and
formally subject to Secretary Henry A. Wallace to establish
marketing agreements and production controls to give farmers
the buying power they enjoyed before the outbreak of World War

6. TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL
EMPOWERMENT 38 (1987).
7. Id. at 39.
8. Id. at 37 (quoting A.M. CARR-SAUNDERS & P.A. WILSON, THE PROFESSIONS 486 (1933)).
9. HALLIDAY, supra note 6, at 40–41.
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I.10 Its administrator, George Peek, had wanted Wallace’s job and
extracted a promise of direct access to FDR before taking the
position.11 Wallace’s assistant secretary was Rexford Tugwell, an
institutional economist who, with two other Columbia professors,
formed FDR’s “brains trust” during the 1932 campaign.12 Jerome
Frank, a corporation lawyer and sojourner among Yale’s legal
realists, was formally Peek’s general counsel, but functionally
Wallace’s and Tugwell’s agent within AAA.13 Wallace, Tugwell, and
Frank shared Wallace’s apartment in the first days of the New
Deal; for a while thereafter, Frank and Tugwell shared other
quarters and became good friends.14
Wallace, Frank and Tugwell were all for raising farmers’
income but all against allowing food processors to pad their
profits. Peek, formerly president of a farm implement company,
was much less solicitous of the consumer, even though the statute
directed AAA to “protect the consumers’ interests” as well as to
establish parity prices.15 But for the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
the marketing agreements would violate the antitrust laws. To
ensure that they were within the antitrust exemption, Frank’s
legal division, which included Alger Hiss, Lee Pressman, and Abe
Fortas, carefully reviewed their terms and insisted on access to
the books and records of the food processors.16 Peek and his
subordinates, recruited from industry, generally joined in the
processors’ resentment of the lawyers’ “captious legal
objections.”17

10. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 45–49 (1958).
11. VAN L. PERKINS, CRISIS IN AGRICULTURE: THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ADMINISTRATION
AND THE NEW DEAL, 1933, at 83, 86–87 (1969).

12. KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS, 1933–1937: A HISTORY 20, 49 (1986).
13. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK 23, 74–75, 155–56 (Oral Hist. Rsch. Off.,
Columbia Univ. ed., 1960); ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME
FRANK’S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW 18–19, 22–25 (1985)
14. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 13, at 25, 72, 81, 115.
15. PERKINS, supra note 11, 95–96; GILBERT C. FITE, GEORGE N. PEEK AND THE FIGHT FOR
FARM PARITY 21–37 (1954); Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 602(3) (1934).
16. PERKINS, supra note 11, at 95; PETER IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 124–25, 132
(1982).
17. PERKINS, supra note 11, at 93–94; Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Couns., Agric. Adjustment
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Early on, Peek’s subordinates complained that the lawyers
were assuming a policymaking role invested in the AAA’s
administrators.18 Frank replied that the legality of the marketing
agreements turned on the scope of Congress’s delegation in the
Agricultural Adjustment Act and, for agreements beyond it, the
reasonableness of their restraint of trade. To resolve those issues,
his lawyers could not possibly “draw a nice line between policy
and law” and “dismiss all questions of policy as none of our
business.”19 Peek pushed back hard; Frank, reassured by Tugwell,
held his ground until Wallace forced Peek out in December 1933.
For months thereafter, the lawyers proceeded confident that in
resisting the administrators they were doing Wallace’s bidding.20
Only when they set their professional authority against the
political might of the Cotton South over the rights of
sharecroppers did Wallace balk and acquiesce in the “purge” of
Frank, Pressman, and others.21
For a contrast, consider the National Recovery
Administration (NRA). The National Industrial Recovery Act
authorized the president to promulgate codes of fair competition
for individual industries. As at AAA, an extremely able group of
lawyers (including Thomas Emerson, Milton Katz, and Stanley
Surrey) advised administrators overwhelmingly recruited from

Admin., Dairy Marketing Agreements and Licenses at the American Institute of
Cooperation 15 (July 9, 1934) (on file with the Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale
University Library). Peter Irons provides the fullest account of Frank at AAA. See
generally IRONS, supra note 16, at 111–32, 156–80 (1982). He also identified disharmony
between chief administrators and general counsels as one of “four major sources of
political conflict” experienced by New Deal lawyers. IRONS, supra note 16, at 10.
18. Memorandum from Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Couns., Agric. Adjustment Admin., to
George N. Peek, Adm’r, Agric. Adjustment Admin. (Sept. 8, 1933) (on file with the Jerome
New Frank Papers, Yale University Library).
19. Memorandum from Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Couns., Agric. Adjustment Admin., to
George N. Peek, Adm’r, Agric. Adjustment Admin. (Oct. 25, 1933) (on file with the Jerome
New Frank Papers, Yale University Library).
20. Letter from Jerome N. Frank to Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 20, 1935) (on file with
the Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale University Library); IRONS, supra note 16, at 128–32;
THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 13, 167–68.
21. DAVID EUGENE CONRAD, THE FORGOTTEN FARMERS: THE STORY OF SHARECROPPERS IN THE
NEW DEAL 136–53 (1965).
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business.22 Once again, the basis for the lawyers’ claim of
authority was statutory: did a code advance the policies of the
statute or did it let industrialists enjoy monopolistic profits?23
Once again, when lawyers insisted on defining the antitrust
exemption, administrators accused them of exceeding their role.
One, who thought of NRA codes as “charters of self-government,”
claimed not to see that the agency’s lawyers had raised “a legal
objection” to a code.24
NRA differed from AAA in at least one important respect. At
AAA, Frank plausibly claimed to be implementing the policies of
Secretary Wallace. At NRA, a Brookings Institution study found,
“there existed no real policy-making body.”25 The Administrator,
Hugh S. Johnson, was a former cavalry officer and had overseen
the draft during World War I.26 He approached FDR’s charge to
NRA “to get many hundreds of thousands of the unemployed back
on the payroll by snowfall” as urgently as he had the creation of
the American Expeditionary Force.27 To arrest the downward
spiraling economy, Johnson instructed his subordinates “to get
the codes in” at once and deal with abuses if and when they
arose.28 Negotiations took the form of “plain horse trading and
bare-faced poker playing,” as administrators agreed to price
controls and production limitations in exchange for pledges of
22. S. DOC. NO. 73-164, at 191, 197, 209; see KENNETH FINEGOLD & THEDA SKOCPOL, STATE
AND PARTY IN AMERICA’S NEW DEAL 94–95 (1995).

23. NIRA also forbid codes “designed to promote monopolies or to eliminate or
oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them.” National
Industrial Recovery Act, 15 U.S.C. § 703(a)(2) (1934), invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
24. Dudley Cates, A Current Appraisal of the National Recovery Administration, 172
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 130, 135 (1934); Memorandum from Dudley Cates to
Hugh S. Johnson (Aug. 18, 1933) (on file with the Records of the National Recovery
Administration, National Archives at College Park, Maryland).
25. Leverett S. Lyon et al., The National Recovery Administration: An Analysis and
Appraisal, in THE INST. OF ECON. OF THE BROOKINGS INST. 3, 61 (1935).
26. JOHN KENNEDY OHL, HUGH S. JOHNSON AND THE NEW DEAL 10–15, 20–35 (1985).
27. Text of Roosevelt Statement on Aims of Industrial Bill, HARTFORD COURANT, June 17,
1933, at 1.
28. Press Release No. 2993, Hugh S. Johnson, Nat’l Recovery Admin., Address before
the Worcester Chamber of Com., Worcester, Massachusetts 5 (Jan. 25, 1934) (on file with
the Library of Congress).
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minimum wages, maximum hours, and the observance of the right
to organize and bargain collectively.29
General Counsel Donald Richberg agreed that industrialists
had to be coaxed into code-making and directed his lawyers to
acquiesce in even dubious provisions.30 Despite this retreat,
lawyers found that administrators, “looking in desperation for
some source of advice detached from any one of the special
interests represented in the code bargaining process,” sometimes
turned to them. On such occasions, their advice went “beyond the
issues of law, far into the realm of general policy.”31
Conflicting signals from the top allowed lawyers to acquire
this authority. Johnson acted as “a mere arbitrator among warring
groups with their relative strengths determining the final
formulation of policy.”32 After his behavior became intolerably
erratic, he was forced out in September 1934.33 His replacement,
a board representing the conflicting factions, did little better.34 In
April 1934, Associate General Counsel Blackwell Smith had been
named “assistant administrator of policy” as well as de facto head
of the legal division;35 he and his lawyers never succeeded in
imposing their policies on the code authorities before Schechter
rang the curtain down.36
At AAA and NRA, lawyers were not or not simply committed

29. Hugh S. Johnson, The Blue Eagle from Egg to Earth, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Jan.
26, 1935, at 91; BERNARD BELLUSH, THE FAILURE OF THE NRA 45–48 (1975); COLIN GORDON,
NEW DEALS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1920–1935, at 174 (1994).
30. See THOMAS E. VADNEY, THE WAYWARD LIBERAL: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF DONALD
RICHBERG 124–35 (1970); Memorandum from Blackwell Smith to Members of the
National Recovery Administration Legal Division, Policy Matters (Sept. 11, 1933) (on file
with the Blackwell Smith Papers, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming).
31. Lyon et al., supra note 25, at 63–64.
32. LEVERETT S. LYON & VICTOR ABRAMSON, GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC LIFE 1040 (1940).
33. See OHL, supra note 26, at 240–54.
34. BELLUSH, supra note 29, at 158–75.
35. Id. at 155 n.2; see VADNEY, supra note 30, at 129.
36. LYON & ABRAMSON, supra note 32, at 1038–39 n.6; Lyon et al., supra note 25, at
742. On May 27, 1935, the U.S. Supreme Court declared the National Industrial Recovery
Act unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935).
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to making federal bureaucracies more closely approximate Max
Weber’s ideal type.37 Recall my government-lawyer-as-sheepdog
metaphor. Sheepdogs react reflexively to their masters’
commands; the New Deal lawyers displayed rather more agency.
“We young fellows were well aware of the varied crew that
manned the New Deal ship of state and that some of our crusading
efforts had to be directed inwards,” Alger Hiss recalled of his AAA
days.38 “For example, Peek was out of step with what we believed
was the ‘true’ spirit of the New Deal; Wallace and Roosevelt, our
leaders and champions, of course exemplified the ‘true’ spirit. So
Peek’s discomfiture and exit seemed to us part of the script.”39
Jerome Frank provides an unusually revealing view of one of
the New Deal lawyers’ tactics, the projection, in something
approaching an act of ventriloquism, of their normative
preferences onto the law, which they then invoked in an assertion
of technical authority. Like other New Deal lawyers, Frank
regularly asserted a technical expertise grounded in positive law.
Milk licenses, for example, had to “be measured by the yardstick
of conformity with the language of the statute.”40 Unlike other
New Dealers, however, he publicly propounded a theory of law
that eroded the distinction between technical and normative
expertise.
“Perhaps there is no greater obstacle to effective
governmental activity than the prevalent notion that the ‘law,’ at
any given period of time, is moderately well known or knowable,”
Frank told a national gathering of social workers in June 1933.41
Statutes and judicial opinions were “extremely defective

37. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 956–58,
974–75 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, eds., 1978).
38. Letter from Alger Hiss to Lawrence J. Nelson (Aug. 21, 1979), in LAWRENCE J.
NELSON, KING COTTON’S ADVOCATE: OSCAR G. JOHNSTON AND THE NEW DEAL 87 (1999).
39. Id.
40. Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Couns., Agric. Adjustment Admin., Dairy Marketing
Agreements and Licenses at the American Institute of Cooperation 15 (July 9, 1934) (on
file with the Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale University Library).
41. Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Couns., Agric. Adjustment Admin., Realistic Reflections on
“Law” as a Constructive Social Force (June 16, 1933) (on file with the Jerome New Frank
Papers, Yale University Library).
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instruments of prediction as to what courts will decide in
particular future cases.”42 In fact, judges started “with what they
consider a desirable decision and then work[ed] backward to
appropriate premises, devising syllogisms” as they went until they
arrived at an aesthetically pleasing justification of “what they
think just and right.”43
Frank implied that the technical expertise of lawyers consists
in their ability to predict how a future judge would decide a case.
He depicted the process in a December 1933 address to the
Association of American Law Schools. In it, he conjured up a
paradigmatic New Deal lawyer, Mr. Try-It.44 One day the young
lawyer was asked to determine
whether, under a certain statute, a proposed program for the relief of the
destitute would be lawful. Mr. Try-it started with his objective. “This,” he
said, “is a desirable result. It is all but essential in the existing crisis. It
means raising the standard of living to thousands. The administration is
for it, and justifiably so. It is obviously in line with the general intention
of Congress as shown by legislative history. The statute is ambiguous. Let
us work out an argument, if possible, so to construe the statute as to
validate this important program.”45

Certainly Mr. Try-It employed one form of Halliday’s technical
expertise, “skill in understanding statutes.”46 Note, though, that
statutory interpretation was the third step in Mr. Try-It’s analysis.
He started with his own belief that “the relief of the destitute” was
“a desirable result.”47 Even verifying that the Roosevelt
administration was “for” relief was a secondary consideration.48
Frank did not say why Mr. Try-It’s notion of “a desirable
result” was a good predictor of what a future judge might

42. Memorandum from Jerome N. Frank, Chairman Sec. Exch. Comm’n to Leon
Henderson, Comm’r Sec. Exch. Comm’n (July 31, 1939) (on file with the Records of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, National Archives, College Park, Maryland).
43. Jerome Frank, Realism in Jurisprudence, 7 AM. L. SCH. REV. 1063, 1065 (1934).
44. See id.
45. Id. at 1065.
46. HALLIDAY, supra note 6, at 39.
47. Frank, Realism in Jurisprudence, supra note 43, at 1065.
48. Id.
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uphold.49 His most likely answer, I think, was that lawyers trained
in “the functional approach” could divine the “immanent
rationality in social life,” which the judge would also heed.50 If this
was indeed Frank’s notion of lawyers’ technical expertise, is it
surprising that his adversaries demurred and complained that his
“principal interest in the AAA was undoubtedly policy and not
law”?51
After all, when AAA lawyers attempted to keep cotton
planters from evicting sharecroppers under Section 7 of their
benefits contract with the agency, several courses of action might
have seemed functional.52 Arguably, the social order of the Cotton
South required that sharecroppers received shelter and a share of
the AAA’s benefit payments. But arguably, too, it required that
planters agree to production controls in future contracts with
AAA, which they would reject rather than give their sharecroppers
a federally enforceable possessory right. Could AAA lawyers really
predict which perception of social need would guide judges when
they interpreted the ambiguous language of Section 7?53
If bureaucracies and professions always marched toward
modernity in unison, then characterizing the lawyers’
contribution to the New Deal as simply the forging of bureaucratic
autonomy might suffice. But, like Brian Balogh, I have found that
they freely departed from the Weberian playbook.54 Working
within agencies that were more “bundles of rules, cognitive
principles, or instruments” than “order-making machines,” the

49. Id.
50. See Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1028
(1981). On the functional approach, see LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960,
at 20–35 (1986).
51. LEONARD D. WHITE, GOVERNMENT CAREER SERVICE 90–91 (1935).
52. The text of Section 7 of AAA’s 1934–1935 cotton contract appears in CONRAD,
supra note 21, at 58.
53. Here I follow Robert W. Gordon’s discussion of Frank. See Robert W. Gordon,
Professors and Policymakers: Yale Law School Faculty in the New Deal and After, in
HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL: THE TERCENTENNIAL LECTURES 75, 100–01, 105–07
(Anthony T. Kronman, ed., 2004).
54. See generally Brian Balogh, Reorganizing the Organizational Synthesis, 5 STUD.
AM. POL. DEV. 119 (1991).
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New Deal lawyers’ goals set them apart from and sometimes
against their administrators.55 Understanding the state they built
requires seeing them not simply as agents of American political
development but also as self-interested actors in American
political history.

55. See GERALD BERK, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE MAKING OF REGULATED CAPITALISM, 1900–
1932, at 15–17 (2009).

